William R. Kelley, Jr. v. Leucadia Financial Corporation, a Delaware corporation : Petition for Rehearing by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1990
William R. Kelley, Jr. v. Leucadia Financial
Corporation, a Delaware corporation : Petition for
Rehearing
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David R. Olsen, Charles P. Sampson, Paul A. Simmons; Suitter, Axland, Armstrong and Hanson;
Attorneys for Respondent.
John A. Snow, Kathryn H. Snedaker; Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall, and McCarthy; Attorneys for
Petitioner.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Kelley v. Leucadia Financial Corporation, No. 900187.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2993
BRIEF. 
„.p£f 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM R. KELLEY, JR., 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
LEUCADIA FINANCIAL 
CORPORATION, a Delaware 
corporation, 
Defendant/Petitioner. 
Case No. 900187 
Priority No. 15 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
On Writ of Certiorari 
From the Opinion and Order 
Of the Utah Court of Appeals, 
Case No. 880534-CA 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
John A. Snow 
Kathryn H. Snedaker 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
Attorneys for Defendant/Petitioner 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
David R. Olsen 
Charles P. Sampson 
Paul M. Simmons 
175 South West Temple, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 532-7300 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent 
F I L E D 
JAN 2 2 1993 
CLERK SUPREME COURT, 
UTAH 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM R. KELLEY, JR., 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
LEUCADIA FINANCIAL 
CORPORATION, a Delaware 
corporation, 
Defendant/Petitioner. 
Case No. 900187 
Priority No. 15 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
On Writ of Certiorari 
From the Opinion and Order 
Of the Utah Court of Appeals, 
Case No. 880534-CA 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
John A. Snow 
Kathryn H. Snedaker 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
Attorneys for Defendant/Petitioner 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
David R. Olsen 
Charles P. Sampson 
Paul M. Simmons 
175 South West Temple, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 532-7300 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
GROUNDS FOR REHEARING 1 
BACKGROUND 2 
ARGUMENT 5 
I. The Court's Decision Misapprehends General Rules 
of Contract Construction and Established Utah 
Precedent 5 
II. Paragraphs G and H Can Be Interpreted Consistent 
With the Law of Specific Performance and at the 
Same Time Give the Ordinary Meaning to the 
Contract Language 9 
CONCLUSION 14 
Appendix A: Decision of the Utah Supreme Court, 
Kellev v. Leucadia, Case No. 900187 
(December 31, 1992) 
Appendix B: Opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals, 
Kellev v. Leucadia, Case No. 88D534-CA 
(January 5, 1990) 
-i-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
Cases 
Ace Realty. Inc. v. Loonev. 531 P.2d 1377 (Okla. 1974) . . 12 
Berry v. Nardozzi, 284 N.E.2d 250 (Mass. 1972) 12 
Carlson v. Hamilton. 8 Utah 2d 272, 332 P.2d 989 (1958) . 6 
Corso v. Creighton University, 731 F.2d 529 
(8th Cir. 1984) 6 
Hum v. Pinner. 608 P.2d 64 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) 11 
King v. Knibb, 447 A.2d 1143 (R.I. 1982) 11 
Lanna v. Greene, 399 A.2d 837 (Conn. 1978) 11 
Leghorn v. Wieland. 289 So.2d 745 (Fla. Ct. App. 1974) . . 6 
Park Valley Corp. v. Baglev. 635 P.2d 65 (Utah 1981) . . . 5 
Peck v. Judd. 7 Utah 2d 420, 326 P.2d 712 (1958) 6 
Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div. of State 
Lands & Forestry. 802 P.2d 720 (Utah 1990) 5 
Professional Executive Ctr. v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 
570 N.E.2d 366 (111. Ct. App. 1991) 6 
Prudential Capital Group Co. v. Mattson, 802 P.2d 104 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990) 5-6 
Reed v. Wadsworth, 553 P.2d 1024 (Wyo. 1976) 12-13 
Robinson v. Compton, 549 P.2d 274 (Idaho 1976) 11-12 
Sawl v. Kwiatkowski. 212 N.E.2d 228 (Mass. 1965) 12 
-ii-
Page 
Other Authority 
17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 367 at 387-88 (1991) 6 
Black's Law Dictionary 1375 (6th ed. 1990) 6-7 
3 Corbin on Contracts § 547 at 176 (1960) 6 
M. Friedman, Contracts and Conveyances of Real 
Property § 1.5 at 113-16 (3d ed. 1975) 10-11 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 203(c) at 93 (1981) . 6 
-iii-
GROUNDS FOR REHEARING 
On December 31, 1992, this Court rendered its 
decision1 in this case holding that, as a matter of law, a 
seller under a standard form Utah Earnest Money Sales Agreement 
is not entitled to rely on the stated terms of that contract. 
Leucadia requests that the Court reconsider its decision on the 
following grounds: 
1. The Court misapprehends fundamental principles of 
law that should govern this decision with serious consequences 
to all parties utilizing standard form real estate contracts. 
2. The Court misapprehends several key facts of this 
case which distinguish it from the cases the Court relied on in 
reaching its decision including (a) that the defect which 
rendered title unmarketable was not a defect over which this 
seller had any control, (b) the defect occurred not as a result 
of any conduct or fault of the seller's, and (c) the defect 
could not be cured by the paying of money. 
As set forth more fully below, petitioner believes 
reconsideration of these key facts and review of critical legal 
precepts will allow this Court to render a decision that both 
recognizes the general application of specific performance of a 
buyer while at the same time adhering to fundamental and long-
standing legal principles, including that parties to a contract 
are entitled to rely on the express terms of that contract 
1
 See Appendix A. 
without fear that a court, without notice, will rewrite 
essential provisions. 
BACKGROUND 
On March 2, 1987, plaintiff William R. Kelley and 
First Security Mortgage Company2 ("First Security") executed a 
standard form Utah Earnest Money Sales Agreement by which First 
Security agreed to sell residential property in Park City, Utah, 
to Kelley. Under the terms of the agreement, the seller was to 
provide marketable title to buyer upon closing. Paragraph G, 
which is the provision dealing with title inspection, provides 
that if there are defects in the title to which the buyer has 
objected, 
Seller shall be required through escrow at 
closing to cure the defect(s) to which Buyer 
has objected. If said defect(s) is not 
curable through an escrow agreement at 
closing, this Agreement shall be null and 
void at the option of the Buyer and all 
monies received herewith shall be returned 
to the respective parties. 
(R. 15.) Similarly, Paragraph H, dealing with title insurance, 
provides that "[i]f title cannot be made so insurable through an 
escrow agreement at closing, the earnest money shall, unless 
Buyer elects to waive such defects or encumbrances, be refunded 
to Buyer, and this Agreement shall thereupon be terminated." 
(R. 15.) 
After the agreement was executed, the parties learned 
that First Security could not convey marketable title to all of 
2
 Leucadia is asserting the rights of First Security in this appeal. (R. 844-46.) 
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the property contemplated by the agreement due to an erroneous 
survey. (R. 143.) The defect which rendered title unmarketable 
was not a defect over which this seller had any control. The 
boundary dispute resulted from a prior erroneous survey and 
previous conveyances of the property incorporating the 
description from the erroneous survey. (R. 81, 150.) It was 
not a defect which could be cured by the payment of money. 
First Security took reasonable efforts to resolve this 
dispute. It attempted to resolve the problem through 
negotiation (R. 357) and, when these efforts were unsuccessful, 
it initiated an action against the adjacent landowners to 
establish correct boundaries. (R. 23-59.) It soon became 
apparent to First Security that the litigation with the adjacent 
landowners would not be satisfied without the expenditure of 
great time and expense. Moreover, First Security was aware that 
it was impossible to predict the outcome of the litigation. For 
these reasons, First Security notified Kelley that it would go 
forward with the action to resolve the boundary dispute if 
Kelley would assist First Security in paying the costs of the 
action. (R. 114-15.) Kelley was unwilling to do so; First 
Security was unwilling to bear the risk and expense of the 
litigation without such participation by Kelley. (R. 114-15.) 
At the time set for closing, First Security was still 
unable to provide marketable title. To determine its course of 
conduct, First Security turned to the terms of the contract that 
it believed governed the relationship between the parties. 
-3-
Understanding that Kelley was unwilling to waive the defect in 
title3 and viewing the contract language objectively, First 
Security understood the mandatory language of paragraphs G and H 
to require termination. 
Kelley continued to insist that First Security acquire 
title to the disputed property and convey it as contracted, and 
filed this action to obtain the court's assistance in this 
regard. The trial court ordered First Security to convey the 
property to Kelley. First Security appealed. The Utah Court of 
Appeals held that Kelley's remedies under the agreement were to 
waive any title defect and proceed with the closing or to 
terminate the agreement and receive a refund of his earnest 
money deposit.4 Slip Op. at 1. The court of appeals 
determined that Kelly refused to waive the defect and, 
therefore, ordered held that Kelley's remedy was limited to a 
refund of his earnest money deposit. Slip Op. at 3. The court 
reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case 
for entry of judgment consistent with the court's opinion. Slip 
Op. at 3. 
This Court reviewed the court of appeal's decision on 
writ of certiorari, reversed the judgment of the court of 
appeals and affirmed the trial court's judgment. The Court 
concluded that pertinent provisions of the earnest money 
3
 In fact, Kelly insisted that First Security resolve the boundary dispute, clear title as provided for in 
the contract, and convey the entire property described in the agreement. (R. 120.) 
4
 See Appendix B. 
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agreement were written only for the advantage of the buyer and 
could not be relied upon by a seller, despite the clear and 
unqualified express terms of the contract. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Court's Decision Misapprehends General Rules of Contract 
Construction and Established Utah Precedent. 
Leucadia requests this Court to reexamine its holding 
that, as a matter of law, a seller under a standard form Utah 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement is not entitled to rely on the 
stated terms of that contract. This holding does not comport 
with several well-established principles of Utah law. 
Utah adheres to the objective theory of contract 
interpretation. 
"The basic rule of contract interpretation 
is that the intent of the parties is to be 
ascertained from the content of the 
instrument itself.... Each contract 
provision is to be considered in relation to 
all of the others, with a view toward giving 
effect to all and ignoring none." The plain 
meaning rule preserves the intent of the 
parties and protects the contract against 
judicial revision. 
Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands & Forestry, 802 
P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990) (citations omitted). See also Park 
Valley Corp. v. Baqlev, 635 P.2d 65, 67 (Utah 1981) ("[S]ellers 
and buyers should be able to contract on their own terms without 
the indulgence of paternalism by the courts in the alleviation 
of one side or another from the effects of a poor bargain."); 
Prudential Capital Group Co. v. Mattson, 802 P.2d 104, 106 (Utah 
-5-
Ct. App. 1990) (same); Carlson v. Hamilton, 8 Utah 2d 272, 332 
P.2d 989, 990-91 (1958) (same); Peck v. Judd, 7 Utah 2d 420, 326 
P.2d 712, 717 (1958) ("It is not [the court's] prerogative to 
step in and renegotiate the contract of the parties."). 
Several fundamental rules of contract construction 
guide Utah courts in interpreting contracts. For example, it is 
axiomatic that where general and specific provisions in a 
contract may relate to the same thing, the more specific 
provision should control. E.g., Corso v. Creighton University, 
731 F.2d 529, 533 (8th Cir. 1984); Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 203(c) at 93 (1981). The rule in its most 
restrictive form is that the specific provisions qualify the 
meaning of the general provisions. 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts 
§ 367 at 387-88 (1991). Corbin applies the rule more 
sweepingly: 
If the apparent inconsistency is between a 
clause that is general and broadly inclusive 
in character and one that is more limited 
and specific in its coverage, the latter 
should generally be held to operate as a 
modification and pro tanto nullification of 
the former. 
3 Corbin on Contracts § 547 at 176 (1960). 
Another rule universally adopted is that the word 
"may" is permissive and "shall" is mandatory in private 
contracts. E.g., Professional Executive Ctr. v. LaSalle Nat'l 
Bank, 570 N.E.2d 366, 373 (111. Ct. App. 1991); Leghorn v. 
Wieland, 289 So.2d 745, 747 (Fla. Ct. App. 1974). Black's Law 
Dictionary defines the term "shall" as follows: 
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As used in statutes, contracts, or the like, 
this word is generally imperative or 
mandatory. In common or ordinary parlance, 
and in its ordinary signification, the term 
"shall" is a word of command, and one which 
has always or which must be given a 
compulsory meaning; as denoting obligation. 
Black's Law Dictionary 1375 (6th ed. 1990). 
The Court's holding in this case that the seller under 
a standard form Utah Earnest Money Sales Agreement is not 
entitled to rely on the stated terms of that contract is 
inconsistent with these fundamental principles. There is no 
indication on the face of the contract that the seller is not 
entitled to rely on the provisions found in paragraphs G and H. 
Rather, the terms of the contract relating to the seller's 
obligation to provide marketable title upon closing state in 
clear, mandatory terms that where there are defects in title 
that cannot be cured through an escrow at closing, the agreement 
shall terminate, unless the buyer waives such defects or 
encumbrances. 
The language in paragraphs G and H could easily have 
been drafted to provide a benefit to only one of the two 
contracting parties.5 Had the parties intended to allow only 
5
 There is no doubt that the drafters of the standard form Earnest Money Agreement were capable of 
drafting provisions applicable only to one of the parties to the contract. Paragraph N of the agreement 
makes such a distinction. It provides: 
In the event of default by Buyer, Seller may elect to either retain the 
earnest money as liquidated damages or to institute suit to enforce any 
rights of Seller. In the event of default by Seller, of if this sale fails to 
close because of the nonsatisfaction of any express condition or 
contingency to which the sale is subject pursuant to this Agreement... 
the earnest money deposit shall be returned to Buyer. 
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the buyer to benefit from the provisions of Paragraph H, for 
example, the drafters could have provided that "if title cannot 
be made so insurable through an escrow agreement at closing, the 
buyer may, at his option, (1) terminate the contract and receive 
a return of the earnest money deposit; or (2) waive the defect 
and proceed to closing; or (3) waive full performance and elect 
to accept that title which the seller is able to convey with an 
abatement in purchase price." The drafters did not so provide. 
Instead, they drafted a provision that appears on its face to 
give protection to both buyers and sellers. They drafted a 
provision that appears on its face to require mandatory 
termination in the event of a title deficiency that is not 
curable through the payment of money at closing.6 Without 
clear notice that a party to a contract is not entitled to rely 
on a material provision of that contract, a court should not 
rewrite the terms of the agreement for the benefit of one party 
alone.7 
6
 There are only a limited number of circumstances where a title defect could not be cured through 
closing, thereby allowing a seller to be relieved from the agreement. Where title defects can actually be 
cured by the simple payment of money in escrow, e.g., to remove liens or encumbrances, the seller would 
be required to perform as stated in the contract. Where, however, no amount of money would "cure" the 
defect (such as in this case where no amount of money could guarantee that a court would find the 
survey erred on the side of the Kelleys), the seller is entitled to receive the benefit of the stated 
provisions of the contract providing for mandatory termination. 
7
 The Court's decision has serious implications for all parties utilizing the standard form earnest 
money. Parties to a standard form earnest money, for example, will no longer be able to assume that the 
rights and obligations expressed in the contract truly extend to both parties to the contract. They will be 
left to speculate, on a provision by provision basis, whether the stated terms actually provided for the 
rights and obligations indicated, or whether, without notice, they will learn that they should have drafted 
a new contract because the protection the parties thought they were receiving were actually only for the 
benefit of one party, but not both, despite the contract's stated terms. 
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The Court also looked to paragraph N, dealing with 
attorney's fees, in determining that a seller cannot rely on the 
specific language in paragraphs G and H. Paragraph N provides 
that if either party defaults in any of the terms of the 
agreement, the defaulting party is responsible to pay all costs 
and expenses, including attorney's fees, which may arise in 
enforcing or terminating the agreement or pursuing any remedy 
available in law. Leucadia recognizes that there are many 
remedies potentially available at law to parties to a real 
estate contract, including specific performance under 
appropriate circumstances. However, Leucadia submits that this 
general provision allowing for the recovery of attorney's fees 
should not be a basis for modifying or replacing the very 
specific provisions which were drafted to accommodate a very 
specific set of circumstances such as those presented here. 
II. Paragraphs G and H Can Be Interpreted Consistent With the 
Law of Specific Performance and at the Same Time Give the 
Ordinary Meaning to the Contract Language. 
The Court's decision expresses the concern that 
to construe paragraphs G and H as barring a 
buyer's right to specific performance would 
allow a seller to breach the contract 
without consequence, since the buyer's only 
remedy would be to rescind the agreement. 
Not only would a seller have no motivation 
to clear title, but the cost of clearing 
title would be shifted to a buyer determined 
to purchase the property. Thus, Leucadia's 
construction would place buyers in a 
disadvantageous position relative to sellers 
and deny them traditional remedies, such as 
specific performance. The even-handed 
protection that a uniform contract form 
-9-
ought to give both parties would become, in 
effect, illusory. 
Decision at 6. The position advocated by Leucadia, however, 
actually works to provide "even-handed protection" to both 
parties and give the full and ordinary meaning to all contract 
provisions. Indeed, the overwhelming majority of courts and 
commentators have so recognized. 
The generally recognized rule of law in this area is 
summarized by Professor Milton R. Friedman: 
Some contracts of sale provide that if 
the seller is unable to deliver good title, 
the seller will return all payments on 
account of the purchase price (plus, 
perhaps, the net cost of title examination 
and of a survey, if any) and thereupon the 
contract will become void. This provision 
is included at the seller's instance to 
avoid a possible liability for substantial 
damages if title should prove defective. It 
protects the seller against such liability 
and bars the purchaser from specific 
performance with an abatement in purchase 
price where the seller acts in good faith. 
The provision has also been held for the 
benefit of the buyer, who may waive the 
defect and entitle himself to the 
conveyance, provided he so elects with 
reasonable promptness. It does not permit 
seller to take advantage of his own breach 
where inability to perform is due to his own 
fault or collusion. Neither does it require 
a seller to buy an outstanding interest at a 
substantial cost, in order to make his title 
marketable. But whether or not seller must 
subject himself to substantial expense to 
clear his title in the absence of bad faith 
depends upon the intentions of the parties. 
Generally speaking, a vendee who seeks 
specific performance may not compel his 
vendor to clear his title by means of 
litigation against a third party, on the 
ground that the court cannot supervise a 
lawsuit. But a vendor has been required to 
clear his title by completing Torrens 
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proceedings and to conduct apparently simple 
proceedings to have old mortgages properly 
satisfied. A subvendor has been compelled 
to exercise his right to purchase, against 
the primary vendor in order to enable him to 
perform under a subcontract. 
The purpose of an exculpatory clause is 
to protect a seller from a possible 
liability for substantial damages if he 
should be unable to convey title in 
accordance with the contract. It should not 
permit him to cancel a contract that no 
longer seems attractive, particularly if the 
purchaser is willing to waive the defect in 
question. Nor should it excuse the seller 
from making reasonable efforts at moderate 
expense to put his title in order. It 
should not excuse him generally from 
satisfying some lien he has created, e.g., a 
mortgage, or has suffered to occur, e.g., 
unpaid real estate taxes. 
M. Friedman, Contracts and Conveyances of Real Property § 1.5 at 
113-16 (3d ed. 1975) (emphasis added, footnotes omitted). 
Courts universally follow this rule. E.g., King v. 
Knibb, 447 A.2d 1143 (R.I. 1982) (specific performance not 
appropriate where title not marketable at closing through no 
fault of seller, seller has not acted in bad faith, and seller 
has not waived the protection of the termination clause); Hum v. 
Pinner, 608 P.2d 64 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) (if, after good faith 
effort by the sellers, they are unable to perfect the title, 
buyers must take the title with the defects or terminate); Lanna 
v. Greene, 399 A.2d 837 (Conn. 1978) (parties' real estate 
contract contractually eliminated vendee's right to specific 
performance with an abatement in purchase price; real estate 
contract like all other agreements must be considered as a whole 
and each part of it must be given effect if possible); Robinson 
-11-
v, Compton, 549 P.2d 274 (Idaho 1976) (parties' stipulation 
eliminating specific performance and abatement as remedy for the 
inability of vendor to provide merchantable title is binding in 
the absence of bad faith and forecloses an action for a 
different remedy). C.f. Berry v. Nardozzi, 284 N.E.2d 250 
(Mass. 1972); Sawl v. Kwiatkowski, 212 N.E.2d 228 (Mass. 1965). 
The cases cited by this Court in its decision are not 
to the contrary. In Ace Realty, Inc. v. Looneyf 531 P.2d 1377, 
1380 (Okla. 1974), the seller under a real estate contract 
sought to terminate the contract on grounds that it could not 
correct a title defect within the time prescribed in the 
contract. The buyer, however, was prepared to waive the defect 
and accept at closing the title which the seller was able to 
convey. Under these circumstances, the court found that the 
seller could not terminate the contract but was required to 
convey that title which it had. The court noted, however, that 
"[i]f the seller is truly unable to satisfy a title defect, and 
the purchaser refuses to waive satisfaction, then the seller is 
entitled to claim frustration of the contract and avoid specific 
performance." 531 P.2d at 1380. 
The Court also cites, Reed v. Wadsworth, 553 P.2d 1024 
(Wyo. 1976), for the proposition that "sellers of real property 
cannot terminate an earnest money agreement under a provision 
permitting the buyers to demand a refund of their earnest money 
when the sellers had breached the contract." While certainly 
-12-
correct as stated, the facts of that case (and thus its holding) 
are really inapposite here. 
The sellers in Reed refused to prepare the final 
papers to close the sale, an act entirely within their control, 
and sought thereby to avoid the contract. Such is not the case 
here. First Security did not by its own conduct create a 
situation to render title unmarketable and then seek to avoid 
the contract. The title defect facing First Security was 
entirely out of its control; no amount of money could have cured 
the defect. Moreover, First Security was not anxious to 
terminate the contract. In fact, it was willing to go forward 
with the closing provided that the buyer acted in accordance 
with the terms of the contract and waive the title defects. 
The interpretation of paragraphs G and H urged by 
Leucadia does not allow a seller to breach the contract without 
consequence. In fact, it expressly recognizes that if the 
seller acts in bad faith and encumbers title to avoid closing, 
or is at fault in any way for the title defect, the buyer would 
be entitled to specific performance of the contract.8 However, 
where, as here, the seller has made a good faith effort to clear 
title and still is unable to do so, the seller should not be 
exposed to unlimited liability to perform. Rather, the Court 
8
 This situation is also covered by the express terms of paragraphs G and H which makes an 
exception where the title defect can be "cured through escrow at closing." Virtually any defect which the 
seller intentionally created, e j ^ a lien or encumbrance, could be cured by the payment of money. See 
supra note 6. 
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should acknowledge that it is precisely this risk that the 
parties bargained away. 
CONCLUSION 
Clearly foreseen by the drafters of the uniform 
contract is the contingency that the seller may be unable to 
cure defects in title through the payment of money at closing. 
In that event, paragraphs G and H, in language that is 
unambiguous and of ordinary meaning, stipulated that the 
purchaser shall at its election choose between two options. 
This language is mandatory and places the burden on the 
purchaser to decide at the closing in which of the two 
designated ways the transaction is then to be brought to an end; 
either by accepting such title as the seller can convey (but 
without any abatement in price for title deficiencies), or by 
rescinding the contract and obtaining a refund of the down 
payment. While, of course, if the seller refuses to convey or 
refund, or deliberately creates a defect in title, the buyer 
could seek recourse in law or equity, this is not such a case. 
The difficulty in this case arose when First Security, 
for reasons entirely beyond its control, found it was unable to 
provide the title for which the agreement called. Kelley then 
refused to choose either of the options to which he expressly 
had been limited in these circumstances. Instead, Kelley sought 
conveyance of either clear title, which First Security was not 
then in a position to deliver, or such lesser title as First 
Security did have power to convey, but with an unbargained 
-14-
abatement in the purchase price. By requesting remedies which 
were contractually excluded, Kelley was, in effect, asking the 
court to redraft the parties' contract of sale. It is 
fundamental that equity enforces contracts; it does not rewrite 
them. 
Leucadia requests the Court to reconsider its 
interpretation of this standard form contract and affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals. 
DATED this day of January, 1993. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
^John A. Snow 
Kathryn H. Snedaker 
Attorneys for Defendant/Petitioner 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
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This opinion is subject to revision before final 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
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On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
STEWART, Justice: 
This case presents the issue of whether a buyer of real 
estate can obtain specific performance of a standard Utah Earnest 
Money Sales Agreement against a defaulting seller. 
First Security Bank (FSB) agreed to sell real property 
to William R. Kelley pursuant to a standard Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement.1 FSB could not provide marketable and insurable title 
because of a boundary dispute. Kelley filed an action for a 
declaratory judgment and for specific performance of the 
agreement. The trial court entered an order directing FSB to 
convey the property to Kelley. 
1
 On appeal, Leucadia has been substituted for FSB as 
defendant. 
The court of appeals reversed the trial court, holding 
in an unpublished opinion that the terms of the standard Earnest 
Money Sales Agreement preclude a buyer from obtaining specific 
performance against a breaching seller. The court held that when 
a seller fails to provide a marketable and insurable title, the 
standard agreement limits the buyer to one of two remedies: 
(1) enforcement of the agreement, but only after the buyer 
tenders full payment of the contract price; or (2) rescission of 
the contract with a refund of the earnest money. We granted 
certiorari because of the potential effect of that ruling on real 
estate transactions using the standard Utah Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement. 
On March 2, 1987, Kelley and FSB executed an earnest 
money sales agreement by which FSB agreed to sell residential 
property in Park City, Utah, to Kelley. Kelley paid $10,000 in 
earnest money to FSB and began liquidating some of his assets to 
obtain the balance due. The closing was set for April 20, 1987. 
The agreement, written on a standard form, included the 
following general provisions: (1) The seller would furnish good 
and marketable title, subject to encumbrances and exceptions 
provided in the contract, "evidenced by a current policy of title 
insurance"; (2) if title insurance was unobtainable due to title 
defects, the buyer could elect to waive the defects or to 
terminate the agreement and have the earnest money refunded; and 
(3) time was of the essence. The seller added a handwritten 
provision stating that the property was sold ,Mas is,' without 
warranty. Title conveyed by special warranty deed." 
FSB acquired the property by quitclaim deed from the 
former owners, who had defaulted on loans secured by the 
property. The property, consisting of approximately thirteen 
acres, included a residence, a stream, and a spring. The stream 
fed a trout pond located in front of the house and provided 
irrigation water for the property. 
After execution of the agreement, a survey revealed 
that FSB's quitclaim deed contained an erroneous property 
description, which misplaced a boundary line by 15.22 feet, 
thereby excluding the stream and spring. In an attempt to cure 
the defect, FSB asked the adjoining property owners, the 
Armstrongs, to convey the disputed property. The Armstrongs 
refused and cut off the water to the pond, causing it to dry up. 
On April 22, 1987, two days after the specified closing 
date, FSB and Kelley agreed to extend the date to June 1, 1987, 
so that FSB could clear up the boundary problem. Thereafter, the 
parties agreed to extend the closing date to July 1, 1987, and 
then to August 31, 1987. 
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In July 1987, FSB filed a complaint against the 
Armstrongs to quiet title to the disputed portion of the property 
and to recover damages caused by vandalism, FSB informed Kelley 
that he need not retain an attorney because the bank would handle 
the litigation. 
On September 4, 1987, four days after the last agreed 
upon closing date, FSB's attorney sent a letter to Kelley, 
demanding that he close the transaction by September 15, 1987. 
The letter stated that FSB would consider the agreement 
terminated if the closing were not consummated by the 15th and 
that FSB was ready and able to sell the property "xas is7 without 
warranty in accordance with the terms of the earnest money 
agreement." FSB also stated that it would not proceed with the 
Armstrong litigation and that it had only pursued the lawsuit 
because it was interested in closing the deal with Kelley and not 
because it had a legal obligation to deliver clear title. FSB 
offered to assign its rights in the Armstrong litigation to 
Kelley and recommended that Kelley obtain counsel. FSB also 
offered to refund Kelley's earnest money should he choose to 
"walk away from the deal." 
Kelley, who was then living in Massachusetts, did not 
receive the letter until September 8, 1987. He immediately 
replied by telegram to FSB, stating that he would not abandon the 
deal. Kelley then retained counsel, who contacted FSB and 
requested copies of all documents relating to the boundary 
litigation. Kelley's counsel asked for a thirty-day extension of 
the closing date so that Kelley could evaluate the litigation and 
its effect on the value of the property. FSB agreed to extend 
the closing date only one week, to September 22, but stated that 
it would cooperate fully with respect to the litigation. 
Kelley's attorney, however, did not receive the necessary 
documents from FSB's attorney until October 15, 1987. 
Nevertheless, on September 22, 1987, Kelley's attorney wrote to 
FSB and tendered Kelley's performance. The letter stated that 
Kelley was ready, willing, and able to close and that the 
necessary funds had been transferred to Williamsburg Savings Bank 
in Salt Lake City to be paid at closing. The letter also stated 
that the "tender is conditioned only upon First Security honoring 
its obligations pursuant to the earnest money sales agreement and 
delivering the property free from those defects which it has 
undertaken to cure." On the same day, Kelley filed a complaint 
against FSB for a declaratory judgment, damages for breach of 
contract, and specific performance. Kelley's funds were 
subsequently deposited with the Summit County clerk. 
On September 24, 1987, FSB executed a release of 
Kelley's $10,000 earnest money deposit, but Kelley refused to 
accept it. The next day, Leucadia Financial Corporation formally 
offered to purchase the property from FSB, and on November 2, 
1987, Leucadia and FSB entered into an earnest money sales 
agreement. Leucadia purchased the property on November 25, 1987. 
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FSB moved to dismiss Kelley's complaint on the grounds 
that Kelley's tender was defective and specific performance was 
not a remedy available under the agreement. Kelley countered 
with a motion for partial summary judgment, asserting that he was 
entitled to specific performance and an abatement in the purchase 
price. The court denied FSB's motion to dismiss and granted 
Kelley's motion for partial summary judgment, ruling that Kelley 
was entitled to specific performance. The court reserved for 
trial Kelley's claim for damages and an abatement in the purchase 
price. Kelley and FSB subsequently settled the abatement and 
damages issues, and the trial court entered a decree of specific 
performance directing FSB to convey the undisputed portion of the 
property by special warranty deed and the disputed portion by 
quitclaim deed. 
The parties stipulated to substitute Leucadia for FSB 
and Leucadia appealed to this Court. Pursuant to Rule 42 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, we transferred the case to the 
court of appeals. The court of appeals held that Kelley was not 
entitled to the equitable remedy of specific performance because 
Kelley's remedies were limited by paragraphs G and H of the 
agreement. Given that ruling, the court of appeals did not 
decide whether Kelley's tender was legally sufficient. 
I. A BUYER'S RIGHT TO SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 
UNDER THE STANDARD EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT 
The terms of the standard Earnest Money Sales Agreement 
have been approved by the Utah Real Estate Commission and the 
Attorney General. With some exceptions not relevant here, real 
estate agents may fill out only those forms approved by the Utah 
Real Estate Commission and the Attorney General. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 61-2-20 (1989)• According to the Utah Association of Realtors, 
which appeared as amicus curiae, the standard form Earnest Money 
Sales Agreement is used in the majority of real estate 
transactions conducted by its members. 
Paragraphs G and H, which deal with title inspection 
and title insurance, were construed by the court of appeals to 
provide a buyer's exclusive remedies against a breaching seller. 
Kelley v. Leucadia Financial Corp*, No. 880534-CA, slip op. at 3 
(Utah Ct. App. Jan. 5, 1990). Paragraph G provides that if there 
are defects in the title that the seller does not cure, the buyer 
may declare the agreement null and have all monies returned. The 
last sentence of paragraph G states: 
If said defect(s) is not curable through an 
escrow agreement at closing, this Agreement 
shall be null and void at the option of the 
Buyer, and all monies received herewith shall 
be returned to the respective parties. 
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The court of appeals held that because Kelley had not declared 
the agreement null and void under paragraph G, his remedies were 
limited to those stated in paragraph H. 
Paragraph H deals with title insurance and confers on 
the buyer a right to nonjudicial rescission if the agreed-upon 
title insurance is not provided. Paragraph H provides: 
If title insurance is elected, Seller 
authorizes the Listing Brokerage to order a 
preliminary commitment for a standard form 
ALTA policy of title insurance to be issued 
by such title insurance company as Seller 
shall designate. Title policy to be issued 
shall contain no exceptions other than those 
provided for in said standard form, and the 
encumbrances or defects excepted under the 
final contract of sale. If title cannot be 
made so insurable through an escrow agreement 
at closing, the earnest money shall, unless 
Buyer elects to waive such defects or 
encumbrances, be refunded to Buyer, and this 
Agreement shall thereupon be terminated. 
(Emphasis added.) The court of appeals held that paragraph H 
allows a buyer either to (1) waive the title defect and pay the 
full purchase price or (2) rescind the agreement and receive a 
refund of his earnest money. Under that construction, Kelley's 
refusal to waive the title defects caused the agreement to 
terminate by its own terms. 
Leucadia argues that Kelley is limited to the remedies 
set forth in paragraphs G and H. That position is untenable. 
Paragraphs G and H do not purport to be exclusive remedies, nor 
do they in any way limit the traditional common law or equitable 
remedies available to a buyer. Rather, these provisions are 
designed to give buyers the right to walk away from the contract 
and obtain a refund of their earnest money without having to 
obtain judicial redress. Thus, the remedies set out in 
paragraphs G and H are for the sole benefit of the buyer. 
A seller is not entitled to take advantage of a 
provision intended to benefit the buyer alone. E.g., Ace Realty, 
Inc. v. Loonev. 531 P.2d 1377, 1380 (Okla. 1975). Ace Realty 
construed a provision of an earnest money sales agreement similar 
to paragraph H. The court stated, "The contractual provision 
that title is to be good and merchantable or the contract will be 
void and the earnest money returned is for the benefit of the 
purchaser, rather than the seller." Id. The court then held 
that a seller could not avoid its contractual obligations under a 
provision clearly for the benefit of the buyer. Id. at 1381. 
Similarly, the court in Reed v. Wadsworth, 553 P.2d 1024, 1034 
(Wyo. 1976), held that the sellers of real property could not 
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terminate an earnest money agreement under a provision permitting 
the buyers to demand a refund of their earnest money when the 
sellers had breached the contract. Accordingly, paragraphs G and 
H give the buyer the absolute right to rescind the agreement if 
the seller defaults, but they do not confer on a defaulting 
seller the right to compel the buyer to either terminate the 
agreement or pay full value notwithstanding the seller's 
defective performance. 
Moreover, to construe paragraphs G and H as barring a 
buyer's right to specific performance would allow a seller to 
breach the contract without consequence, since the buyer's only 
remedy would be to rescind the agreement. Not only would a 
seller have no motivation to clear title, but the cost of 
clearing title would be shifted to a buyer determined to purchase 
the property. Thus, Leucadia's construction would place buyers 
in a disadvantageous position relative to sellers and deny them 
traditional remedies, such as specific performance. The even-
handed protection that a uniform contract form ought to give both 
parties would become, in effect, illusory. 
Leucadia's position that paragraphs G and H provide 
exclusive remedies is also inconsistent with paragraph N, which 
makes clear that those provisions were not intended to be a 
buyer's sole remedy. Paragraph N deals generally with the 
remedies available in the event of a default by either the buyer 
or the seller. It states: 
In the event of default by Buyer, Seller may 
elect to either retain the earnest money as 
liquidated damages or to institute suit to 
enforce any rights of Seller. In the event 
of default by Seller, or if this sale fails 
to close because of the nonsatisfaction of 
any express condition or contingency to which 
the sale is subject pursuant to this 
Agreement (other than by virtue of any 
default by Buyer), the earnest money deposit 
shall be returned to Buyer. Both parties 
agree that should either party default in any 
of the covenants or agreements herein 
contained, the defaulting party shall pay all 
costs and expenses, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue 
from enforcing or terminating this Agreement, 
or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder 
or by applicable law, whether such remedy is 
pursued by filing suit or otherwise. 
(Emphasis added.) Paragraph N clearly contemplates that both 
buyers and sellers may pursue "any remedy provided hereunder or 
by applicable law." The language "any remedy . . . under 
applicable law" means all applicable statutory, common law, and 
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equitable remedies. Specific performance with an abatement in 
the purchase price has long been recognized as an appropriate 
remedy when a seller refuses to convey. Castagno v. Church. 552 
P.2d 1282, 1284 (Utah 1975). 
Buyers and sellers are, of course, at liberty to modify 
a standard agreement and negotiate terms that limit or expand the 
remedies of one or both parties. There is no evidence here, 
however, to suggest that the parties intended to limit Kelley's 
remedies to preclude specific performance. 
II. TENDER 
We now turn to the issue of whether Kelley made a 
timely and unconditional tender of his performance to FSB. The 
trial court found that Kelley made an unconditional tender. The 
court of appeals, however, did not address the issue because it 
held that paragraphs G and H controlled Kelley's remedies. The 
parties have briefed this issue, and we address it in the 
interest of judicial expediency. 
To obtain a decree for specific performance against a 
defaulting party, the aggrieved party must make an unconditional 
tender of the performance required by the agreement. Century 21 
All Western Real Estate & Inv., Inc. v. Webb, 645 P.2d 52, 56 
(Utah 1982); see also Baxter v. Camelot Properties, Inc., 622 
P.2d 808, 811 (Utah 1981); Zion's Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 
P.2d 1319, 1322 (Utah 1975). Neither party to an agreement "can 
be said to be in default (and thus susceptible to a judgment for 
damages or a decree for specific performance) until the other 
party has tendered his own performance." Century 21, 645 P.2d at 
56. In other words, "a party must make a tender of his own 
agreed performance in order to put the other party in default." 
Id. ; see also Fischer v. Johnson, 525 P.2d 45, 46-47 (Utah 1974). 
The tender cannot impose on the other party a new 
condition or requirement not already imposed by the contract. 
Century 21, 645 P.2d at 56; accord 5A Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on 
Contracts § 1233 (1964) [hereinafter "Corbin"]. If the law were 
otherwise, one could use a tender to compel the other party to 
comply with new contractual terms. Accordingly, a tender, as a 
general rule, must be unconditional. A tender that contains an 
improper condition or requirement disqualifies a party from 
obtaining a decree of specific performance. Baxter, 622 P.2d at 
811; Century 21, 645 P.2d at 56. A party to a bilateral contract 
may, however, properly condition a tender on the others 
performance, since such a condition does not impose a requirement 
beyond that already contained in the contract. 5A Corbin § 1233. 
Leucadia argues that Kelley's tender was defective 
because Kelley7s demand for a title free from the boundary defect 
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was a new condition not contained in the agreement, Kelley 
responds that his demand did not impose a new condition on FSB, 
but insisted only that FSB do that which it had promised to do in 
the agreement and had, in fact, undertaken to do by filing the 
lawsuit against the Armstrongs. 
Whether Kelley's demand that FSB cure the title defect 
constituted a conditional tender depends on whether the agreement 
already obligated FSB to do so. Paragraph 3 of the agreement 
states that the seller "agrees to furnish good and marketable 
title to the property, subject to encumbrances and exceptions 
noted herein." The primary obligation of a seller under an 
earnest money sales agreement is to provide marketable title. 
Marketable title is one that may be "freely made the subject of 
resale" and that can be sold at a "fair price to a reasonable 
purchaser or mortgaged to a person of reasonable prudence as 
security for the loan of money." 77 Am. Jur. 2d Vendor and 
Purchaser § 131, at 313-14 (1975). Generally, when a seller 
agrees to convey marketable title, the seller must undertake to 
cure defects if it can be done in the exercise of reasonable 
diligence and within a reasonable time. See, e.g., Ace Realty, 
Inc. v. Looney, 531 P.2d 1377, 1380 (Okla. 1975). 
The boundary dispute with the Armstrongs constituted a 
cloud on the title and adversely affected the value and 
marketability of the property, a fact FSB admitted in its 
complaint against the Armstrongs. FSB argued to the trial court 
that the ,Mas is/ without warranty" language in the handwritten 
notation referred to warranties of title and therefore released 
FSB from any obligation to resolve the boundary dispute. That 
argument is not valid. In the same notation, FSB agreed to 
convey the property to Kelley by special warranty deed. A 
special warranty deed, although not as broad as a general 
warranty deed, carries with it certain warranties of title. 
Therefore, the "as is" language did not modify FSB's express 
promise to convey marketable title. 
FSB's own conduct and statements support this 
conclusion. FSB acknowledged its obligation to provide clear 
title when it undertook the Armstrong litigation and told Kelley 
that he need not retain an attorney. For a period of four 
months, FSB, by its actions and statements, led Kelley to believe 
that FSB would resolve the boundary problem and deliver clear and 
marketable title, as it was obligated to do under the contract. 
Not until its letter of September 4 did FSB disclaim any 
obligation to do what it had previously acknowledged. It was 
only then, and for the first time, that FSB stated that it had 
undertaken the litigation, not because it was obligated to, but 
because of FSB's interest in closing the deal with Kelley. 
In view of FSB's express promise to provide clear and 
marketable title and its having undertaken litigation to do so, 
we hold that Kelley's tender did not impose a new condition, but 
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was merely a request that FSB do what it was contractually 
obligated to do. 
III. TIMELINESS 
Finally, Leucadia argues that Kelley cannot seek 
specific performance because time was of the essence and Kelley 
failed to tender his performance by the closing date. Because 
the closing date had been extended several times by mutual 
agreement, Kelley properly tendered his performance on 
September 22, the last agreed upon closing date. We therefore 
reject FSB's argument. 
The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and 
the trial court's judgment is affirmed. 
WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R. 
Christine 
Hall, 
M. 
Chie 
Durham, 
f Justice 
Justice 
Regnal W. Garff, Jr., Court 
of Appeals Judge 
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice: (Concurring) 
I concur but write to point out an inconsistency 
between paragraph G and paragraph H of the agreement. The last 
sentence of paragraph G provides that if a defect in title is not 
curable through an escrow at closing, the agreement shall be null 
and void at the option of the buyer. The last sentence of 
paragraph H states that if title cannot be made insurable through 
an escrow at closing, the agreement shall be terminated unless 
the buyer elects to waive the defects or encumbrances. While 
paragraph G speaks of a "defect in title" and paragraph H deals 
with a "title that cannot be made so insurable," I believe that 
they both address the same thing. Yet in paragraph G, 
termination is at the option of the buyer, whereas in 
paragraph H, termination appears to be mandatory unless the buyer 
elects to waive the defects. It was here that the court of 
appeals was misled. It construed paragraph H literally instead 
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of in light of paragraph G. Justice Stewart has properly 
reconciled the two paragraphs by holding that termination is 
intended to be at the option of the buyer. 
I think the court of appeals also erred in that it did 
not consider whether the defect in title here could be cured 
through an escrow at closing as provided for in both paragraphs G 
and H. From all that appears in the record before us, a 
stipulated amount could have been withheld from the purchase 
price at closing and escrowed pending resolution of the boundary 
dispute. 
Zimmerman, Justice, having disqualified himself, does 
not participate herein; Garff, Court of Appeals Judge, sat. 
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JACKSON, Judge: 
Leucadia Financial Corporation (Leucadia)1 appeals a 
summary judgment decree of specific performance requiring it to 
convey real property to respondent (Kelley) pursuant to a sales 
agreement. The lower court reserved Kelley's damages as an 
issue to be tried, but the parties settled that issue out of 
court prior to the appeal. We reverse. 
The issues we must decide are (1) whether the parties9 
sales agreement provides remedies to Kelley if Leucadia is 
unable to convey marketable title, and (2) whether those 
remedies require conveyance by Leucadia if title is not 
marketable. 
1. During the proceedings below, Leucadia succeeded to the 
interest of the original seller, First Security Mortgage 
Company. For simplicity, we will refer to Leucadia as the 
seller. 
The property contemplated by the parties in their sales 
agreement was not surveyed until after the parties executed 
that agreement. The survey revealed that Leucadia's property 
description did not include certain acreage containing a 
stream, a pond, and a spring, all of which the parties had 
believed to be part of their agreement. Leucadia was unable to 
resolve the land description problem by negotiating with the 
adjoining property owner. Thereafter, Leucadia initiated 
litigation against the adjoining owner and then decided it was 
not worth prosecuting. While Leucadia was trying to clear 
title to the disputed land and water rights, the parties in the 
instant action extended their closing date. Later, each of the 
parties maneuvered to obtain remedies which each believed to 
flow from their contract. 
Leucadia offered to convey title subject to the defects 
or to return Kelley's earnest money deposit. Kelley tendered a 
portion of the agreed purchase price and insisted that Leucadia 
clear title and then convey the property. Simultaneously, 
Kelley filed suit for (1) a declaratory judgment of the 
parties' rights under the terms of the contract, and (2) 
specific performance pursuant to the contract terms, as 
declared. 
The lower court implicitly interpreted the contract as 
not providing an agreed remedy in the event Leucadia could not 
convey clear and marketable title to all the property. 
Judgment was entered for an equitable remedy, i.e., specific 
performance, with an abatement of the purchase price to 
follow. Thus, the lower court interpreted the parties' 
agreement as a matter of law, not determined by extrinsic 
evidence of intent. We accord that construction no particular 
weight and review the determination under a correctness 
standard. fi££ Kimball V, Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 
1985). Whether ambiguity exists in a contract is also a 
question of law. Faulkner v. Farnsworth. 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 
(Utah 1983). We find, BS r natter of law, no ambiguity in the 
agreement concerning the rights and remedies of the parties in 
the event title was found to be defective and unmarketable. 
A cardinal principle of contract law is that, in the 
absence of fraud or mutual mistake, a clear and unambiguous 
contract must be enforced according to its terms. Fast v. 
EAlLftn, 206 Kan. 682, 481 P.2d 958, 961 (1971). The terms of 
the contract, where clear and unambiguous, are conclusive. 
Goodman v. Newzona Inv. Co.. 101 Ariz. 470, 421 P.2d 318, 320 
(1966). The first source of inquiry is the written document 
itself. Bio Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake Citv 
Corp., 740 P.2d 1357, 1359 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), Thus, we turn 
to the terms to which these parties agreed. 
Leucadia agreed "to furnish good and marketable title to 
the property," subject to encumbrances and exceptions noted in 
the contract. Paragraph G (Title Inspection) of the agreement 
provided a title inspection procedure prior to closing, 
including how the parties would deal with any title defect trial 
appeared: "If said defect is not curable through an escrow 
agreement at closing, this agreement shall be null and void at 
the option of the buyer, and all monies received herewith shall 
be returned to the respective parties." Kelley refused to 
accept this option. The parties agreed that title insurance 
would be utilized for closing. Paragraph 4 (Title Insurance) 
of the agreement provided the procedure for insuring title: 
"If title cannot be made insurable through an escrow agreement 
at closing, the earnest money shall, unless Buyer elects to 
waive such defects and encumbrances, be refunded to Buyer, and 
this agreement shall thereupon be terminated." Title could not 
be made insurable without exceptions for defects. Kelley 
refused to waive the defects, thus his remedy, as agreed, was 
limited to a refund of his earnest money deposit, not specific 
performance. 
We have examined the other issues argued by the parties, 
including that of tender,2 and conclude they are roeritless or 
that they do not require our consideration in light of the 
clear and unambiguous terms of the parties' agreement.3 
2. This court recently discussed the requirement of tender, 
Where a purchase agreement contemplates simultaneous 
performance by the parties, in Bell v. Elder. 121 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 16 (Ct. App. 1989), ai . Carr v. Enoch Smith Co.. 119 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 89 (Ct. App. 1989). fififi also Utah Code Ann. 
S 78-27-1 (1987). 
3. In its brief, Leucadia touched on a related issue of 
vandalism, believed to have been committed by the adjoining 
landowner, which diverted the water and dried up the pond. 
Paragraph P (Risk of Loss) of the parties9 agreement provided a 
procedure for dealing with loss or damage to the property prior 
to closing Kelley did not seek to use that procedure. 
The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case 
is remanded for entry of judgment consistent with this opinion. 
Nortnan H. Jacksoiv^'Judge 
I CONCUR: 
, /0 . 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
BENCH, Judge (dissenting): 
The main opinion reverses this judgment because there is 
no contractual provision allowing for specific performance. If 
Kelley made a proper and timely tender of payment, I believe 
the remedy of specific performance is available. 
My colleagues are correct in limiting the parties' 
remedies at law to the terms of the contract. If there was a 
•defect" in Leucadia's title, the contract permits Kelley to: 
1) waive the defect and go through with the purchase; or 2) 
take a refund of his earnest money. In this case, Leucadia 
agreed to sell property located at a specific address in Summit 
County. Leucadia had good and marketable title to property 
located at that address. Leucadia erroneously believed and 
represented that the property contained a neighboring stream, 
pond, and spring. That fact should not cloud title to the 
property Leucadia actually owned. There is, therefore, no 
•defect- in Leucadia1 s titK. fiftfi Black's Law Dictionary 1332 
(5th ed. 1979) (defective title means unmarketable title). 
Clearly, where the contract has not provided a legal remedy, 
the trial court could order specific performance of the 
contract. 
Even where a legal remedy is provided, however, the trial 
court has the discretion to order specific performance of the 
contract if the legal remedy is inadequate. Sfi£ generally 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 357-360 (1981). "The rule 
has been long established that a vendee has the right to insist 
upon performance by the vendor to the extent the latter is able 
to perform with an abatement in the purchase price equal to the 
value of the deficiency or defect." Castagno v. Church, 552 
P.2d 1282, 1284 (Utah 1976); fififi Alfifi In re Havhurst's Estate. 
478 P.2d 343 (Okla. 1970); Streator v. White. 26 Wash. App. 
430, 613 P.2d 187 (1980). 
I believe the trial court had the discretion to order 
Leucadia to convey the property it owned with an abatement in 
the purchase price. Resolution of this appeal should turn not 
on the unavailability of specific performance as a remedy, but 
on whether Kelley made a proper and timely tender, as argued by 
the parties. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
fienc^ii rn 
